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Essay
Transparency and Transmission:
Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and
Market Responses to Workplace Problems
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER
This Essay develops a comprehensive theory of the role of information
in regulatory and market responses to workplace problems. Existing legal
and economic scholarship has focused narrowly on transparency mandates
that reveal facts about the hidden conditions of work—for example, the
health risks to which workers are exposed without their knowledge, or
undisclosed pay differentials between men and women. Scholars and
policymakers assume that when employers are required to reveal this
information, regulators, outside interest groups, and workers themselves
will penalize bad actor employers via the market, regulation, or rightsenforcing litigation. However, information about the hidden conditions of
work is not self-actuating. Regulatory and market responses depend on
additional layers of information—information about context, process,
incentives, and the probability and magnitude of other actors’ regulatory
and market responses—all of which have been largely ignored in the
literature. Accordingly, this Essay offers a typology of the information that
may support rights-enforcing and market responses to workplace
problems. It then surveys existing transparency mandates to determine the
extent to which each type of information is currently made available in the
workplace. The Essay concludes by mapping out topics for further
research, including the First Amendment implications of drafting
employers into the role of information transmitters and the empirical
question of how best to design workplace transparency mandates to
accomplish their goals.
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Transparency and Transmission:
Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and
Market Responses to Workplace Problems
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For thirty years, Geraldean Matthew worked on the muck farms around
Lake Apopka, Florida, hand-harvesting the vegetables that grew in the
rich, black lakeshore soil.1 As she worked, crop dusters flew overhead,
coating everything below—fields and workers alike—with “strong
chemicals that you could smell on your skin at the end of the work day.”2
Ms. Matthew now suffers from a host of debilitating medical conditions
that she attributes to pesticide exposure.3 Though the Apopka muck farms
have long been closed, visitors today are barred from entering the fields by
signs that warn about the presence of “agricultural chemicals, some of
which, such as DDT . . . may present a risk to human health.”4 When Ms.
Matthew and her fellow farmworkers were in the fields, however, they
received no such warning, and had no information about what, exactly, was
being dumped on them from above, and what it was doing to their health.5
Many states away and several decades later, Kelly Contreras began
work in Wisconsin as a store manager for the country’s largest retail

*
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, J. Mack
Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University; secondary appointment, Georgia State
University College of Law. Thanks to the participants in the 2014 Labor and Employment Law
Colloquium, University of Colorado Law School at Boulder and the 2014 American Business Law
Journal Invited Scholars Colloquium. Thanks also to Helen Norton and Stephen Shore for their helpful
feedback.
1
Christopher Balogh, Apopka Farmworkers Say Pesticide Exposure Caused Illnesses, ORLANDO
WEEKLY (June 1, 2011), http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/apopka-farmworkers-say-pesticideexposure-caused-illnesses/Content?oid=2248681 [http://perma.cc/K5BT-7LV3]; see generally BARRY
ESTABROOK, TOMATOLAND: HOW MODERN INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE DESTROYED OUR MOST
ALLURING FRUIT 48 (2012) (“In 1941, as part of the wartime effort to produce more fruits and
vegetables, nineteen thousand acres of swamp on the lake’s north shore were drained to make way for
‘muck farms’ in the rich soil.”).
2
Balogh, supra note 1.
3
DALE FINLEY SLONGWHITE, FED UP: THE HIGH COSTS OF CHEAP FOOD 36–39 (2014).
4
ESTABROOK, supra note 1, at 49; see also Balogh, supra note 1.
5
Balogh, supra note 1 (quoting a former Apopka farmworker as saying that she and other
workers “are lost in a ‘chemical soup,’” lacking “evidence that they’ve been hurt by pesticides”).
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jewelry chain. She was paid approximately $35,000 per year.7 Her
husband, who had similar industry experience, was also a store manager at
the same company.8 His annual salary was $55,000.9 After three years, Ms.
Contreras had amassed multiple company awards and was promoted to
district manager.10 Her husband, who had been promoted to district
manager the year before, continued to out-earn her by $10,000.11 Ms.
Contreras knew about this salary discrepancy by the happenstance of her
marriage; company rules prohibited workers from sharing information
about their pay.12
Information is crucial to workplace rights enforcement. If Ms.
Contreras had not known her husband’s salary, she may never have
discovered that she was subject to sex-based pay discrimination,13 and may
never have engaged in corrective action. She could not have complained
internally to her employer, made a report to a government enforcement
agency, or filed a lawsuit—as she eventually did—under the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Information is equally central to market-based solutions to workplace
problems. If a worker like Ms. Matthew does not know about her health
risks at work, she cannot “shop around” for a better job and penalize her
unsafe employer by quitting; she cannot call the media; she cannot
organize a consumer boycott or incite investor or advocacy group pressure.
Nor can regulators or outside interest groups take affirmative action to
address workplace problems if they do not know that problems exist.
As a result, scholars and policymakers have long advocated for rules
that would force employers to reveal information about the hidden

6
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Arbitration Complaint ¶¶ 103–05, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers,
Inc., AAA Case No. 11 160 00655 08 (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/7/
media.187.pdf [http://perma.cc/JX8V-Q3E9] [hereinafter Jock, First Amended Complaint].
7
Id. ¶ 113.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. ¶¶ 107–08, 111.
11
Id. ¶ 114.
12
Id. ¶ 34.
13
This account assumes for the sake of illustration that the pay gap can be explained only by the
workers’ gender and sets aside other possible explanations for the difference or general market-based
objections to the prohibition of sex discrimination in pay. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica
R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159,
162–63 (2011) (discussing “market excuses” for pay discrimination such as the belief that women fail
to negotiate their salaries at the time of hire and that downstream differences in salaries between men
and women can therefore be explained by women’s and men’s different negotiating choices rather than
employer bias). In fact, a store manager explained to another female plaintiff in the case that a male
worker was paid more than his more experienced female counterparts “because he had a child to
support.” Jock, First Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 72.
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conditions of work, focusing primarily on hazard warnings and pay
transparency rules.15 In a pair of recent articles, Professor Cynthia Estlund
proposes a dramatically expanded workplace transparency regime, in
which employers would be required to reveal information about wages,
scheduling, hazards, job security, work-life policies, covenants not to
compete, arbitration agreements, and workplace demographics.16 In
Estlund’s view, this information would enable workers to make better
choices about whether to take or keep a job; enable regulators to identify
employer scofflaws and enhance legal compliance; and allow do-gooder
firms to enhance their reputation by advertising their “beyond compliance”
policies and practices.17 Similarly, as Professor Kip Viscusi explains in his
extensive writing on workplace safety, workers armed with hazard
information can exact a price from their employers either by quitting or by
demanding a wage surplus to compensate for their health and safety
risks—eventually, either result can pressure the employer to correct the

14
Since the late 1970s, Professor Kip Viscusi has studied hazard warnings that inform workers of
toxin exposure. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN
THE WORKPLACE (1983) [hereinafter VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE]; W. KIP VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT
HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979) [hereinafter VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT
HAZARDS]; W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER
RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 125–26 (1987) (reporting findings that “provide support for the
efficacy of information policies to control the hazards from dangerous products”); see also Ronnie
Greene, Farmworkers Plagued by Pesticides, Red Tape, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 25, 2012),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/06/25/9159/farmworkers-plagued-pesticides-red-tape [http://perm
a.cc/5EHZ-25ZD] (quoting an Environmental Protection Agency document as noting that, even for a
government agency, the lack of information surrounding the number of occupational pesticide incidents
per year “inhibits clear problem identification”).
15
Many scholars have championed pay transparency rules, which would force employers to
publicize their wage and salary schedules and prohibit bans on workers’ discussions of pay. See
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011)
[hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts]; see also Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace
Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 783 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter
Estlund, Extending the Case] (citing Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure.
Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 169–70
(2004); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 41, 53 (2005); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 1008 (2011); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond
the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory Wage Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the
Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 385, 419–35 (2013); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay
Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1047–48 (2012)); Jeremy Blasi, Note, Using Compliance
Transparency to Combat Wage Theft, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95 (2012) (discussing wage
transparency proposal). See generally Estlund, Just the Facts, supra, at 784 n.13 (noting that seasonal
and agricultural workers’ wages must be disclosed under federal law and that New York, Iowa, and
Nebraska have all enacted some form of pay transparency requirement).
16
See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 15; Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15. Part III,
infra, identifies additional types of workplace transparency mandates.
17
Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 369–79 (discussing disclosure in aid of contract,
disclosure in aid of compliance, and disclosure in aid of reputational rewards and sanctions).
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underlying hazard. Information is thus instrumental: transparency
mandates are designed with the first-order goal of revealing the true
conditions under which workers are employed, but also with the secondorder goal of prompting regulatory or market responses to improve those
conditions.
However, this view of information’s triggering role is incomplete.
While information about the hidden conditions of work is necessary for
market discipline and rights enforcement, it is far from sufficient. The key
insight here is that factual information about the hidden conditions of work
is not self-actuating. In other words, arming workers like Ms. Matthew
with the name, concentration, and health risks of the chemicals with which
she was sprayed and allowing Ms. Contreras freely to discuss her salary
cannot trigger a regulatory or market response on its own. These workers
must have additional layers of information before they can even identify
their chemical exposure or pay disparity as a sub-market practice or
potential violation of the law and decide what to do about it.
Accordingly, this Essay develops a comprehensive theory of
information’s role in the enforcement of labor and employment laws, and
in the broader project of improving workplace conditions. This
contribution is important, as it enables assessment of the sorts of
information-centric regulatory strategies that are increasingly popular
across the political spectrum as a less onerous, almost “magic” alternative
to command-and-control substantive regulation.19 If such strategies focus
on only one type of information and neglect the others, then they cannot
harness the market and facilitate law enforcement in the way that
proponents envision.
First, this Essay identifies the three sets of actors who might engage in
rights-enforcing or market responses to a workplace problem: workers
18
VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14, at 73 (“Providing workers with additional
information about job risks will sharpen their assessment of the risks, which will tend to increase the
wages the firm must pay.”); VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 129 (noting findings that disclosure
of information about “higher [job hazard] risks led to both a demand for more risk compensation and
higher intended quit rates”).
19
Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 353, 354 (observing that “mandatory disclosure has
become a growing part of the modern state's regulatory repertoire” and that mandated disclosures about
“risks, returns, costs, [and] benefits” are central features of securities, consumer finance, health,
environmental, education, and food and drug safety regulation); id. at 354 (describing disclosure
mandates as “sometimes appear[ing] as a kind of magical minimalism that delivers significant rewards
at little cost”); see also VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 2 (“From an economic standpoint, the
potential role of labels and other forms of information transfer is identical: all of them influence
perceptions of risk and, ultimately, individual behavior.”); David J. Doorey, A Model of Responsive
Workplace Law, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 67 (2012) (“Information disclosure regulation is another
preferred tool in the decentred regulation arsenal . . . .”); cf. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14,
at 72–73 (“Information directed at improving safety, such as safety training procedures, has two types
of effects. First, it may alter workplace safety levels. . . . Second, providing safety information has
purely informational aspects . . . .”).
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themselves, regulators, and outside interest groups, defined here as
consumers, investors, and advocates.20 It also identifies the circumstances
under which an employer might take affirmative steps to correct a problem
even in the absence of prompting by one of those three.
For each actor, the Essay then identifies the types of information that
may support regulatory or market responses. Here, this Essay complements
and extends the existing literature by hypothesizing a layered set of five
types of workplace information: Estlund- and Viscusi-style firm-specific
information about the hidden conditions of work (Type A); context
information that allows comparison to conditions at other firms or to the
substantive requirements of the law (Type B); process information that sets
out the necessary steps for engaging in market discipline or rights
enforcement (Type C); incentives information that reveals the benefits of
market or regulatory action (Type D); and information on the probability
and magnitude of other actors’ responses to the workplace problem (Type
E).21
After establishing this theory, the Essay surveys labor and employment
law and identifies existing transparency rules that force or incentivize
transmission of information of each of the five types. At present, the law
requires disclosure of some information types in certain circumstances, but
never the full complement at the same time.
Finally, this Essay catalogs some challenges to and complications with
workplace transparency mandates, including the First Amendment
implications of drafting employers into the role of information provider
and the empirical question of whether transparency mandates actually
achieve their first- and second-order goals. These questions are raised here
in brief, but deferred for complete examination in a second, companion
article.22
Thus, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part II elaborates on the typology
of workplace actors and information introduced above, building on
previous legal and economic scholarship on the functions of information in
the workplace. Part III surveys existing workplace transparency
mandates—those already identified in the literature and those that have
been left out—and maps them onto the typology. Part IV briefly catalogs
the First Amendment questions and logistical complications raised by
workplace transparency mandates. Part V concludes.

20
This configuration borrows heavily from Estlund’s description of the three outcomes of
employer disclosure mandates and the actors who would drive those outcomes, particularly her
discussion of the role of intermediaries. Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 369–76.
21
FIGURE 2 in Part II.B, infra, illustrates these types of information.
22
Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information Forcing: Constitutionality and Effectiveness,
53 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
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II. DEVELOPING A TYPOLOGY OF WORKPLACE
ACTORS AND INFORMATION
A. Existing Legal and Economic Scholarship on Workplace Information
The existing legal scholarship on information in the workplace has
focused narrowly on forcing the transmission of firm-specific facts about
the hidden conditions of work—referred to here as “Type A”
information—to facilitate the enforcement of labor and employment
laws.23 In this view, rights violations can be obscured when the underlying
facts are held exclusively or actively hidden by the employer, with no real
opportunity for independent discovery.24 When employers are required to
reveal Type A information, the assumption is that workers and regulators
can then engage in rights enforcement: Ms. Contreras files suit; Ms.
Matthew files a workers’ compensation claim or complains to a
government agency; agencies take independent enforcement action even in
the absence of worker complaints.25 Outside interest groups, including
advocacy organizations, consumers, and investors, might also penalize
firms that engage in unlawful workplace practices by filing lawsuits or
making government complaints of their own (assuming they have
standing). The disclosure of Type A information about rights violations
might also prompt outside interest groups to engage in market discipline by
boycotting the firms’ goods and services, impugning their reputation, or
divesting from their companies.26 In addition, employers themselves might
be prompted to correct legal problems affirmatively if transparency
mandates force them to identify and disclose underlying Type A facts.27
23
See, e.g., Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 365–67 (proposing a variety of Type A
employer-disclosure mandates).
24
Of course, this information might become available during the discovery phase of litigation, but
this opportunity for information transmission necessarily comes after a workplace problem has been
identified.
25
See Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Information disclosure regulation is another preferred tool in
the decentred regulation arsenal . . . . [T]here is also a long history of using information regulation to
influence firm behaviour in such areas as environmental and human rights practices . . . . It can clarify
the expectations of contracting parties, which can reduce the possibility of the more powerful
contracting party taking advantage of the weaker party. Disclosure regulation can also empower private
actors in their engagements with the disclosing firms. By providing information about firm behaviour
to private watchdogs, it can alter the relative balance of power between the firms and the watchdogs
and thereby alter the dynamic of the negotiations.” (footnote omitted)).
26
See id. (“If disclosing information about some aspect of firm performance could potentially
influence sales or increase public appetite for more formal government oversight, then it can encourage
corporate leaders to take a more personal interest in the firm's performance, and perhaps to introduce
more effective systems to ensure that the firm's performance improves relative to other similarly
situated firms.”).
27
See id. (“Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors. It facilitates self-learning or selfreferential fact-finding; a firm that does not know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is unlikely to take
steps to alter that behaviour.”).
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The economics literature presents a different view of the function of
workplace transparency: even if Type A information reveals no specific
violations of labor and employment laws, transparency mandates may still
allow workers and firms to match to one another more precisely.28 Here,
the goal of transparency is to enhance market efficiency rather than to
facilitate law enforcement—that is, to allow a worker to seek out a firm
with characteristics that fit her preferences.29 In the absence of Type A
information, uncertainty about the true conditions of work may dissuade
workers from entering the labor market at all, or may result in their
accepting a job that is a bad match.30 On the other hand, for example, when
workers are aware of toxins at work and know their own and their coworkers’ wage rates, they can assess the fit of their current or potential job
with their preferences. In the case of a mis-fit, workers might quit or forgo
a job opportunity, or might demand a wage premium or other concession
from the employer as compensation.31 This information-driven matching
28
See, e.g., VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE, supra note 14, at 73 (“[W]orkers could improve their job
choices if they knew of the risks posed by different positions . . . .”).
29
See Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Disclosure regulation is usually justified as marketcorrecting: it corrects information asymmetries that impede the efficient clearing of markets.”); John
Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 825, 846 (2006) (“Many of the prominent examples of penalty default rules in the contractual
area serve the purpose of information-forcing in the service of efficiency.”).
30
For an archetypal discussion of the ability of information transmission mandates to correct
market failures caused by information asymmetry in a sales contract setting, see George A. Akerlof,
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489
(1970) (“An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have more
knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But good cars and bad cars must still sell at the
same price—since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car.”).
Examples of information asymmetry and information forcing in other contexts include toxicity
information held exclusively by polluters and private information held by a party to litigation. See
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861,
874 (2006) (describing state regulation that “gives toxic polluters in California an unusual incentive to
cooperate with state regulators in setting, justifying, and defending numerical regulatory standards and
to produce and disclose as much credible toxicity and exposure information necessary to enable
regulators to implement these regulatory standards”); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to
Settlement or Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 183, 183 (1989) (developing a model of information
asymmetry in which “one party [to litigation] possesses ‘private’ information [that] pertains to the
expected judgment he would obtain from trial—to the likelihood of prevailing at trial or to the size of
the judgment he would receive in that event”). In the alternative to a mandate, information might be
transmitted in response to incentives. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing the concept
of “penalty defaults” used to fill gaps in contracts, the avoidance of which incentivizes better-informed
parties to disclose information); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 916 (2015) (“[A] legal-information-forcing rule would force the
comparatively better informed party to choose between revealing the relevant . . . information or
accepting a default rule that favors the less informed party.”).
31
Kip Viscusi and his co-authors have written extensively about this process in the context of
hazard labeling and workers’ risk assessments. See, e.g., VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 100–01
(“[W]orkers are engaged in a continuous experimentation process in which they learn about the risks
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process not only improves the functioning of the labor market, but may
also, over time, prod employers who experience high job vacancy or quit
rates, or who have to meet workers’ repeated compensatory wage
demands, to correct the underlying workplace problems.32
Thus, taken together, the legal and economics literatures identify three
actors who might respond to a workplace problem that is disclosed via
Type A information: workers, regulators, and outside interest groups. Each
of these actors, in turn, is assumed to engage in a rights-enforcing and/or
market response, and the employer itself might also take affirmative,
corrective action upon receiving Type A information. FIGURE 1 below
maps out these three actors, plus the employer, and their assumed
regulatory and/or market responses to workplace problems that are
revealed by the disclosure of Type A information.

posed by their job and quit once the position becomes sufficiently unattractive.”). The threat of
quitting, or the employer’s inability to fill a job with a given risk profile, may then produce higher
wages that include a wage differential that compensates workers for taking on that job’s health and
safety risks. Id. at 129 (“[H]igher risks led to both a demand for more risk compensation and higher
intended quit rates.”).
32
In addition to Viscusi, Estlund also builds on this literature by characterizing one of the goals of
employer disclosure mandates as “disclosure in aid of contract.” Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15,
at 371 (“[E]conomic theory suggests that employees armed with better information about terms and
conditions of employment will be more likely to find jobs that suit them at wages that reflect the actual
features of the job, and employers will be more likely to deliver job features that meet employee
preferences.”).
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FIGURE 1: Actors’ Assumed Regulatory and Market Responses to the
Disclosure of Type A Information
Type A information

Actor
Workers

Outside
interest
groups

Regulators

RightsEnforcing
Response(s)
 Remain in
job and file a
lawsuit
 Remain in
job and
complain to a
regulator
 Complain to
a regulator
 File a lawsuit
(if standing)

Market
Response(s)

Combined
Response(s)

 Remain in
job and make
a wage
demand
 Quit or reject
a potential
job
 Reputational
penalty
 Boycott
 Divestment

 Engage in
complaintdriven
enforcement
 Engage in
affirmative
enforcement

 N/A

 Exit job and
file a
lawsuit
 Exit job and
complain to
a regulator
 File
complaint/
lawsuit and
engage in
market
discipline
 N/A

Employer

However, contrary to the assumptions embedded in the legal and
economics literatures, Type A information alone is not self-actuating. One
or more of four additional types of information may be necessary to
support the rights-enforcing and market responses summarized in FIGURE
1.33
B. Additional Necessary Workplace Information: Workers
Another story illustrates the necessary but insufficient nature of Type
A information. In 2006, after Hurricane Katrina, a shipyard with locations
33
To be clear, this Essay does not argue that even a full complement of all five information types
would in all cases be sufficient to trigger action to correct workplace problems. This is discussed
further in Part IV.B, infra. Instead, the claim here is that Type A information alone is insufficient. At
minimum, more information of different types is needed. At maximum, more information of different
types plus a different substantive and procedural law regime, different market conditions, and different
incentive structure around workplace rights enforcement and market discipline may be sufficient.
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in Mississippi and Texas imported almost 600 men from India with
temporary H-2B guestworker visas to repair oil rigs and other equipment
that was damaged by the storm.34 The workers were kept in “guarded,
overcrowded, and isolated labor camps,” where visitors were rarely
allowed.35 They were subject to threats, “psychological abuse, and
coercion.”36 They were paid less than the minimum wage,37 and exorbitant
fees for their squalid housing were deducted from their paychecks.38
These workers were well aware of the conditions under which they
were working; there was no need for a transparency mandate to reveal the
desperate, obvious facts of their jobs.39 Unlike Ms. Matthew, who knew
that she was being exposed to something but did not know its name or its
health risks, and unlike Ms. Contreras, who but for her marriage could not
have discovered that she was paid less than her male counterparts, there
was nothing hidden about the circumstances under which the H-2B
workers were employed.
However, the H-2B workers’ Type A knowledge of the conditions of
their jobs could not, in and of itself, trigger them to take action. In their
isolation, these workers had no access to other information that would
enable them to engage in a rights-enforcing or market response to the
workplace problems they encountered. They could not give meaning to and
contextualize their experiences by comparing their jobs to available jobs at
other firms40 or to the substantive requirements of U.S. labor and
employment laws. They did not know the process by which they might
seek out other jobs or seek to enforce their labor and employment rights.41
They could not accurately assess the potential costs and benefits of rightsenforcing or market action; they had no sense of whether other regulatory
or market actors might come to their figurative rescue by independently
34
Sixth Amended Complaint ¶ 1, David v. Signal Int’l, No. 08-1220-SM-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 5,
2014); see also Federal Jury in SPLC Case Awards $14 Million to Indian Guest Workers Victimized in
Labor Trafficking Scheme by Signal International and Its Agents, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter SPLC Award], http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/federal-jury-in-splc-case-awa
rds-14-million-to-indian-guest-workers-victimized-in- [https://perma.cc/74YQ-GVK8].
35
Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶¶ 6, 209.
36
Id. ¶ 6
37
Id. ¶ 216.
38
Id. ¶ 534–40.
39
Viscusi has pointed out that express warnings about the conditions of work may not be
necessary once a worker engages in a process of on-the-job learning, which is often sufficient to alert a
worker of the true conditions of work. VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 100 (describing a process
of Bayesian updating in which “workers begin jobs with imperfect information . . . . [and] [a]fter
acquiring risk information, most workers display the capacity to update their probabilistic beliefs”).
40
Indeed, the terms of the H-2B visas prohibited workers from changing jobs; if they left their job
at Signal International, they were required to return to India rather than take a new job in the United
States. Julia Preston, Suit Points to Guest Worker Program Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A12.
41
Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶ 9 (describing the plaintiffs as “[d]eeply indebted,
fearful, isolated, disoriented, and unfamiliar with their rights under United States law”).
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forcing change at their workplace.
Thus, if information is going to trigger the sorts of outcomes
envisioned by Estlund and Viscusi, transparency mandates cannot stop at
Type A information alone. Type A information is merely the raw material
of workplace problems, describing what is actually happening on the job.
Ms. Matthew and Ms. Contreras needed access to that raw material, which
otherwise would have been hidden from them by the policies and
structures of their workplaces. The H-2B workers did not need such access,
as they lived their workplace problems every day. Regardless, for any of
those three sets of workers, Type A information alone is insufficient.
Focusing here on workers as the relevant actors, then, five total types of
information are necessary, differing in content depending on whether
workers engage in a rights-enforcing or market action. (The information
necessary for regulator and outside interest group action is discussed
further in the section that follows.) FIGURE 2 illustrates these five
information types.
FIGURE 2: Information Necessary for Market and Rights-Enforcing
Responses to Workplace Problems
Market response
Context
information
(conditions at
other firms)
Firm-specific
information
(hidden
conditions of
work)

Process
information
(e.g., job
application
process)

Incentives
information
(market
action’s
benefits and
costs)

Rights-enforcing response
Context
information
(substantive
law)

Process
information
(e.g., admin.
exhaustion
rules)

Other actor
information
(probability
and
magnitude of
action)

Incentives
information
(benefits and
costs of
enforcement)

As explained above, Type A information consists of facts about the onthe-ground conditions of work that are held exclusively by the employer or
to which the employer blocks access. Type B is information about context.
This information provides a point of comparison and framework for
understanding Type A information. The context could be the conditions of
work at other firms, or it could be the requirements of substantive labor
and employment law. Either way, Type B information gives meaning to
Type A information and allows workers to assess how bad, as a relative
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matter, their conditions of work actually are.
Type C information concerns process, or the steps that a worker must
take to engage in a rights-enforcing or market response to the problem
exposed at the Type A stage. Here, a worker might need to know about
administrative presentment or exhaustion rules, e.g., the requirement of
filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of a discriminatory event.42 If the
worker is contemplating a market response, he or she would need to know
about the availability of job openings at other firms, their qualification
requirements, and the process by which he or she could apply.43
Type D information, in turn, reveals to workers the costs and benefits
of taking either market or regulatory action. On the rights-enforcing track,
this would include what I have called in other work “operational rights,” or
the set of protections and incentives built into labor and employment laws
that are designed to encourage worker lawsuits.44 These include protections
against retaliation, liquidated (double) damages, and attorneys’ fees and
costs for prevailing plaintiffs. On the market side, Type D information
would include the full range of transaction and opportunity costs incurred
by switching jobs.
Finally, Type E information consists of the probability and magnitude
of other actors’ responses to disclosed information about workplace
42

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012).
Worker’s rights-enforcing and market responses to a workplace problem may in some sense be
interchangeable. In other words, when opportunities to switch jobs are slim, a worker might instead
stay at her current job and file a lawsuit or complain to a government agency. See ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
STATES 30 (1970) (defining a worker's choices when faced with a problem within her organization as
exit, voice, and loyalty: “Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs”); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and
Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
709, 710 (1993) (“[A] strong economy is a powerful ally for victims of discrimination. Indeed, many
such individuals have deemed this market remedy to be preferable to the legal remedies for
discrimination that have been in place for the past twenty-five years. When the economy is healthy,
victims of discrimination can more easily find new jobs without suffering an extended period of
unemployment. Many potential litigants bypass their legal remedies when they believe that adequate
market opportunities exist. Conversely, a recessionary economy, and the excess supply of labor that
attends it, creates an opportunity for employers to indulge discriminatory preferences and choose
workers on the basis of irrational prejudice or tastes.”).
44
Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 386 (2012) (coining the term “operational rights” to describe the set
of incentives and protections that “encourage statutory enforcement through private lawsuits by directly
influencing potential plaintiffs' decision-making; they put substantive rights into operation. . . . [and]
are designed to increase the benefits of taking legal action and decrease the costs, acting as a thumb on
a worker's cost-benefit scale and tipping it in the direction of exercising ‘voice’ on the job”); Charlotte
S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND.
L.J. 1069, 1102 (2014) (further explaining the concept of “operational rights”); see also Margaret H.
Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 783 (2011) (discussing “suit boosters” or
incentives offered to plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring private litigation).
43
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problems. In some sense, Type E information is a subset of Type D
information, in that Type D reveals to workers the costs and benefits of
taking action. If workers are assured that another actor is going to address,
effectively, workplace problems—if OSHA is going to inspect and clean
up an unsafe workplace, for example, or if the U.S. Department of Labor is
going to file a wage and hour suit against an employer—then the benefits
of a worker’s taking independent enforcement action or leaving the firm
would be slight. However, this Essay treats Type E information as a
separate category because of its importance to actors’ decision-making. As
explained further below, employers in particular may be especially
sensitive to the likelihood and probable magnitude of other actors’
responses in deciding whether to take affirmative steps to address disclosed
workplace problems.
Returning to the earlier stories, the H-2B workers described above
were eventually able to make contact with workers’ rights advocates, who
equipped them with the information necessary for a group of plaintiffs to
file suit under a variety of federal employment and anti-trafficking laws. In
February 2015, five of those workers won a jury verdict of $14 million.45
Ms. Contreras, too, ultimately filed suit against her employer, alleging that
she was subject to pay discrimination in violation of federal employment
law.46 She likely gathered the context, process, incentives, and other actor
information necessary for her claims from fellow workers who had already
joined the lawsuit, or perhaps from information provided by the plaintiffs’
class action attorneys.47
Ms. Matthew’s story provides a sobering counter-example, however,
of the importance of Type B–E information in triggering worker action.
Ms. Matthew now suffers from the autoimmune disease lupus, which she
attributes to her decades-long pesticide exposure.48 She says that, “[a]s far
45

SPLC Award, supra note 34 (describing jury award).
Jock, First Amended Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 1–3. In February 2015, an arbitrator granted
class certification in the suit to a class of 44,000 current and former women to proceed with their pay
discrimination claims. Class Determination Award at 2, 118, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 11 20
0800 0655 (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/0/media.1710.pdf [http://perma.cc
/R7TT-J9B2] (Part 1) and http://www.cohenmilstein.com/media/pnc/1/media.1711.pdf [http://perma.cc
/K87Y-VBAH] (Part 2); Sterling Jewelers, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/97/
sterling-jeweler [http://perma.cc/3X8A-SPN8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
47
For example, class counsel for the plaintiffs have the following notice on their website: “It is
very important that anyone, female or male, who has information about these discrimination allegations
or more generally about how Sterling has treated its women employees please call the lawyers . . .
providing your contact information and where you worked for Sterling . [sic] You may also contact our
co-counsel . . . . We are interested in speaking with former or current employees, both male and female.
(Please note that we are not ethically permitted to discuss the case with current managers unless they
believe they have experienced or are experiencing gender discrimination at Sterling).” Sterling
Jewelers, supra note 46.
48
SLONGWHITE, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing Ms. Matthew’s lupus diagnosis); id. at 104
(discussing links between pesticide exposure and lupus).
46
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back as 1974, we [farmworkers] talk[ed] among ourselves because we
knew that when we go home at night there was something going on with
our bodies.”49
However, Ms. Matthew did not engage in a rights-enforcing response:
she did not file a workers’ compensation claim, sue her employer, or
complain to a regulatory agency. Though she clearly lacked complete Type
A information about her chemical exposure, she attributes her and her
fellow workers’ silence to two additional information deficits: lack of legal
rights information (Type B) and lack of information about the incentives
for rights-enforcing action (Type D). She describes many farmworkers as
lacking information about their legal rights; as she says, “Why should
[employers] recruit a person who is educated and smart and know[s] the
law?”50 She also describes the costs of engaging in rights-enforcing
behavior:
In the fields, if you go talkin’ about you got sick because of
the pesticides, there was a hush mouth, because if you didn’t
keep your mouth closed, they would retaliate against you.
They would tell you, ‘Well, you don’t come back.’ And then
you wouldn’t have a job, so you had to take a lot of stuff.51
Ms. Matthew received no countervailing information describing the
potential benefits of rights enforcement—paid medical costs and other
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, or changes in farms’ use of
hazardous chemicals—to weigh against this retaliation risk.52
Nor did Apopka farmworkers penalize their employers via the labor
market by quitting en masse. Indeed, the growers in the area may have
actively blocked workers from receiving information on other available
jobs (Type B) and the requirements and process for a job switch (Type C).
As one journalist commented, after the State of Florida shut down the
Apopka muck farms due to pesticide-related mass bird deaths (not,
importantly, due to harmful effects on workers’ health), “[workers] were
not retrained for new jobs because the powerful farmers feared that
educated workers would abandon the fields before the last carrot or tomato
was picked.”53
49

Id. at 39.
Id. at 48.
51
Id. at 39.
52
As discussed further in Part IV, infra, even if Ms. Matthew did know about the potential
benefits of rights enforcement, they may not have outweighed the risks associated with filing a lawsuit.
See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1106 (“Against these costs, the benefits of claiming appear
paltry. Though back pay may be available to a plaintiff at the end of a lawsuit, if that amount is
insufficiently large—and for plaintiffs who sue because they were paid less than the minimum wage,
back pay awards will, by definition, be quite small—then enduring the uncertain, stressful, drawn-out
process of litigation may not be worth it.”).
53
ESTABROOK, supra note 1, at 49.
50
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Thus, the differing outcomes in these three worker stories illustrate the
need to consider the full complement of information that is necessary for
market or regulatory action by workers themselves, rather than assuming,
as much of legal and economic literature does, that mandating the
transmission of Type A information alone is sufficient.
C. Additional Necessary Workplace Information: Regulators and Outside
Interest Groups
Workers are only one possible actor who might address workplace
problems. Regulators and outside interest groups may also take market or
rights-enforcing action, and employers might take affirmative action
themselves upon learning Type A information about workplace problems.
Yet these actors, too, need a full complement of context, process,
incentives, and other actor information, in addition to and on top of Type A
disclosures.
As an initial matter, Type A disclosures will often be more important
to regulators and outside interest groups than to workers and employers,
who are “insiders” to the employment relationship and thus already know
about the on-the-ground conditions of the work. To be sure, as discussed
above, Type A information may be necessary even to insiders when
aspects of work are hidden, and the very act of making those disclosures
might also “inform” an employer who previously overlooked or ignored
those facts.54 But Type A information will have the most importance for
regulators and outside interest groups, who otherwise will be uninformed
about most aspects of a job. Here, Estlund’s work on the ways in which
publically disclosed workplace facts can aid in compliance efforts and
reputational rewards and sanctions is instructive: she notes that
government agencies that learn about workplace problems (Type A) can
take appropriate rights-enforcing action, and that firms can suffer marketbased reputational (and resulting financial) harm when workplace
problems are exposed to the public.55
54
Doorey, supra note 19, at 67 (“Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors. It facilitates selflearning or self-referential fact-finding; a firm that does not know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is
unlikely to take steps to alter that behaviour.”).
55
Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 373–74 (“Public disclosure of compliance-related
information would help to promote compliance by making noncompliance more visible and
enforcement more likely.”); see also id. at 376–77 (“The aspiration behind these schemes is not merely
to promote informed consumer decisions, but to improve producers’ performance. For example, the
point of disclosing fat and calorie content on food labels is not only to inform health-conscious
consumers but also to shift nutritional demand and supply toward healthier foods. The point of
disclosing the energy efficiency of appliances and vehicles is not only to inform environmentally and
economically conscious buyers but also to improve energy efficiency. Similarly, the point of requiring
firms that emit toxic substances to disclose their emissions is not only to inform communities but also
to induce firms to reduce emissions.”).
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Yet, again, Type A information is not enough; other types of
information are important to regulators and outside interest groups as well.
Turning first to regulators: government enforcement agencies can be
assumed to know the substantive law they are charged with enforcing
(Type B), as well as the process for and costs and benefits of enforcement
(Types C and D). Type E information then becomes critical, as regulators
decide how to spend their limited enforcement dollars. If, for example,
workers themselves have been successfully filing and winning their own
lawsuits against a group of lawbreaking employers, a regulator might be
disinclined to engage in enforcement in that particular industry. David
Weil, Director of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division, has recommended this very strategy, advocating that regulators
focus their investigatory and enforcement efforts on “‘fissured’ industries[]
in which businesses employ high numbers of subcontractors and other
contingent workers and disclaim any legal responsibility for wages and
working conditions.”56 Because workers in these industries would face
significant legal barriers in holding their employers responsible for wage
and hour violations, Weil has exhorted regulators to step in to fill the
enforcement void.57 This is an example of Type E information’s spurring a
rights-enforcing response, where a regulator calibrates its approach to a
workplace problem according to the independent responses (or lack
thereof) of other potential enforcement actors.
Turning next to outside interest groups: consumers, investors, and
advocacy organizations might engage in their own market or regulatory
actions, and a different suite of information is necessary for each response.
On the rights-enforcement track, investors might file suit against a
corporation’s directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty if the
company is revealed to be engaging in a pattern and practice of violating
labor or employment laws. To do so, the investors need to know something
about the substantive law and legal process as well as the benefits that
might accrue as a result of such a suit. Likewise, consumers might engage
in a boycott of a company’s products or services upon revelation of
damaging Type A information. Again, to do so, they would need
contextual Type B information to determine whether conditions at the
target company are atypical, and therefore perhaps vulnerable to public
pressure, or whether conditions are merely the norm across an industry as a
whole.
Finally, as discussed above, employers themselves might be prompted
56
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1117–18 (discussing DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING
WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR
DIVISION 18–26 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [http://perma.cc/
BH73-UBFD]).
57
WEIL, supra note 56, at 75–95.
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by the revelation of Type A information to take affirmative steps to correct
workplace problems, even in the absence of litigation, regulation, or
outside group pressure. Again, however, additional information is likely
necessary to trigger an affirmative employer response. Like all other
actors, employers need to know something about context (Type B) to
gauge the relative severity and importance of the disclosed problem. In
addition, Type E information may be the most influential for employer
decision-making. If an employer knows that the likelihood of regulator
enforcement action, a worker lawsuit, mass exodus of workers, a boycott,
reputational harm, and/or divestment are near nil, then the likelihood of an
affirmative employer response is also likely to be near nil. Put another
way, if maintaining sub-legal or sub-market working conditions is
currently profitable for an employer, and Type E information reveals no
threat of enforcement or market discipline, then the profit-maximizing
employer is highly unlikely to make changes on its own. Thus, whether the
information types described here would result in market or rights-enforcing
action by any actor is in some ways circular, as any one actor’s response to
workplace problems depends on its knowledge and prediction of other
actors’ responses.58
Therefore, for each actor and each market and rights-enforcing
response, it is clear that Type A information must be disclosed, but that
Type A is merely the first of multiple kinds of necessary information. The
following Part surveys existing workplace transparency mandates in labor
and employment law—those already identified in the literature and those
left out—and maps them onto the typology developed in FIGURE 2.
III. A SURVEY OF EXISTING TRANSPARENCY MANDATES
A. Existing Type A Disclosures
In her work on employer disclosure mandates, Cynthia Estlund
characterizes “mandatory disclosure [as] a largely unexplored concept in
the employment field.”59 The three transparency mandates that she does
identify all require transmission of Type A information: the Hazard
Communication Standard issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), under which employers must inform workers about
toxins on the job;60 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
58
Unscrupulous employers may in fact manipulate other actors’ likelihood of engaging in a
rights-enforcing or market response. See, e.g., Sixth Amended Complaint, supra note 34, ¶¶ 7–9,
(detailing instances of employer threats to prevent worker protests and actions to block workers from
leaving their jobs). See generally Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the
Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2013) (discussing employer threats as
mechanisms for silencing worker claims).
59
Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 352.
60
Id. at 377 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (2010)).
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(ERISA), under which “[e]mployers must disclose the terms of health and
benefit plans;”61 and pay transparency rules in some areas of federal and
state employment law that require disclosure of the employer’s wage
schedule and prohibit retaliation against workers who share information
about their pay.62
Professor J.H. Verkerke provides another example of Type A
information transmission: where an employer’s statements about loyalty
and job tenure create an expectation of job security, courts in some states
create a good cause exemption to the doctrine of at-will employment.63 As
Verkerke explains, the threat that a court might apply this exemption in a
worker’s wrongful discharge lawsuit can prompt employers to clearly
disclose employees’ at-will status.64 The threat of the good cause
exemption acts as a transparency mandate, forcing the employer to reveal
Type A information about the true extent of the worker’s job security.
To this list, this Essay adds two more transparency mandates, both of
which also prompt employers to inform workers of their status and security
at work. First, the U.S. Department of Labor has proposed a “Right to
Know” initiative, which would require employers to tell workers whether
they are classified as employees or independent contractors under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).65 This information is often hidden from
workers unless and until an employer challenges a worker’s employee
status as a defense in an FLSA lawsuit. Second, the Worker Adjustment
61

Id. at 352 n.1.
Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 15, at 784 & n.13 (citing the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1831 (2012), as well as pay transparency laws enacted in
New York, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195(1)(a) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2014), Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§
91E.1–E.6 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.), and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482209, -2214 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). President Obama also issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking in September 2014 that would require pay transparency for federal contractors by
prohibiting retaliation against those workers who share information about their pay. OFFICE OF FED.
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS, PROHIBITIONS AGAINST PAY SECRECY AND ACTIONS 1
(n.d.), http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/PayTransparencyFactSheet_JRF_QA_508c.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8
B9-8DGN]. This anti-retaliation approach creates “space” for worker sharing of information about their
wages and working conditions and mirrors in some ways the NLRA’s concerted activity provision,
which has been interpreted to protect that space for worker discussion and peer information
transmission. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to engage in concerted activity);
see also Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 929
(2012) (“[A] different kind of protection—protection from monitoring and surveillance—may be
necessary before the employee speaks. Employees may need some space to seek information, to
explore ideas and discuss concerns with others before they are ready to speak in the ways that the law
most values . . . . If employees are unable to communicate about shared workplace concerns without
employer scrutiny, collective speech is unlikely ever to emerge.”).
63
Verkerke, supra note 30, at 925.
64
Id. at 937.
65
Right to Know Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2010), http://
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/unifiedagenda/fall2010/1235-AA04.htm [http://perma.cc/C2KW-AVZQ].
62
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and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) requires that employers provide
sixty days’ advance notice to workers of impending mass layoffs or plant
closings.66 Again, a firm might otherwise shield this information from
discovery in order to maintain investor confidence as long as possible. The
WARN Act forces disclosure of this Type A information to workers.
Thus, there are examples of Type A disclosure rules scattered
throughout employment law that prompt the transmission of information
about employees’ occupational health risks, pay and benefits, employee
status, and job security. Each of these disclosures transmits facts that are
known solely, and sometimes actively hidden, by the employer, and that
workers are unable to discover independently.
B. Existing Type B, C, and D Disclosures
If Estlund is correct that scholars have left Type A workplace
transparency mandates “largely unexplored,” then they have left the other
types completely off the scholarly map.67 However, one need only scan the
walls of break rooms and office kitchens across America to discover
multiple mandated disclosures about Type B, C, and D information:
posters and notices that inform workers of their substantive rights under
various labor and employment laws, the process for making a claim, and
protections against retaliation. Many employers also provide antiharassment materials to workers (Type B) and create and disseminate
information about internal complaint procedures (Type C).
Almost no scholarly attention has been paid to these ubiquitous
examples of workplace information transmission, despite their essential
role, as explained in Part II, in building on Type A information to trigger
rights-enforcing or market responses to workplace problems. Accordingly,
this Part presents an in-depth examination of three instances of Type B–D
workplace information transmission: the FLSA break room poster, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedial notice, and employers’
anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures. Each of these informs
workers of their substantive legal rights, rights-enforcement procedures,
and incentives for rights-enforcement action, and also puts employers
themselves on notice.68 The end of this Part turns from the regulatory to the
market track, briefly examining the forms that Type B–D information
66

29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2012).
Indeed, Estlund acknowledges the problem that “[e]mployees may also lack important
information about the law of the workplace,” but “set[s] that problem aside.” Estlund, Just the Facts,
supra note 15, at 363 n.42.
68
This Part focuses exclusively on workers and, to a lesser extent, employers, leaving out a
discussion of disclosure of Type B–D information to regulators and outside interest groups. As
discussed above, these actors are less likely to be in need of Type B–D disclosures, as they already
have access to those sets of information.
67
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might take in the context of a market response to the disclosure of a
workplace problem.
1. The FLSA Break Room Poster
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) requires employers to display up
to eleven different posters covering a range of topics from polygraph
protection to migrant farmworkers’ rights; other federal and state agencies
require additional or different disclosures. 69 This Part focuses on one of the
eleven: the FLSA poster concerning workers’ rights under the statute, the
current version of which is included as FIGURE 3 in the Appendix.
All employers covered by the FLSA have been required to display a
poster describing workers’ wage and hour rights since 1949.70 The poster

69
Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small Businesses and Other Employers, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR [hereinafter Poster Page], http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster/
matrix.htm [http://perma.cc/X6A2-Z6ZV] (last visited July 27, 2015); see also Peter D. DeChiara, The
Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 433 (1995) (discussing federal and state agency poster
requirements); Joseph H. McFarlane, Note, Poster Wars: The NLRB and the Controversy over an 11by-17-Inch Piece of Paper, 38 J. CORP. L. 421, 429 (2013) (discussing federal and state agency poster
requirements). Notably, there is no requirement that employers hang a poster describing workers’ rights
under the NLRA; this omission, and the NLRB’s attempt to rectify it, is discussed at length in Part IV,
infra.
70
29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2014) (“Every employer employing any employees subject to the Act's
minimum wage provisions shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act, as prescribed by the
Wage and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every establishment where such employees are
employed so as to permit them to observe readily a copy. Any employer of employees to whom section
7 of the Act does not apply because of an exemption of broad application to an establishment may alter
or modify the poster with a legible notation to show that the overtime provisions do not apply. For
example: Overtime Provisions Not Applicable to Taxicab Drivers (section 13(b)(17)).”). The FLSA
poster requirement had its genesis in Industry Wage Orders, which under the original 1938 version of
the FLSA were used to set minimum wages on a per-industry basis “to phase low-wage industries into
the minimum statutory wage.” Wage and Hour Division Economic Report for American Samoa
Industry Committee No. 26, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/as/sec1.htm
[http://perma.cc/Q6FU-ZF5D] (last visited July 27, 2015). These orders often “included a requirement
that employers post appropriate notices [of the FLSA’s requirements] in conspicuous places where
covered employees are working.” Posting of Notices, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516, 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949). In
1949, drawing on “the accumulated experience of the [DOL’s Wage and Hour] Division over a period
of more than 11 years,” the DOL issued a uniform workplace poster rule that required every employer
covered by the FLSA to “post and keep posted such notices pertaining to the applicability of the Fair
Labor Standards Act as shall be prescribed by the Division, in conspicuous places in every
establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them to readily observe a copy on
the way to or from their place of employment.” Id. Curiously, DOL regulations establish no “citation or
penalty for failure to post,” Poster Page, supra note 69, but some courts have held that an employer’s
failure to display the poster can warrant tolling of the FLSA’s statute of limitations, see, e.g., Asp v.
Milardo Photography, 573 F. Supp. 2d 677, 698 (D. Conn. 2008) (collecting cases and concluding that
“the trend regarding the failure to post FLSA notices . . . permits equitable tolling where the plaintiff
did not consult with counsel during his employment and the employer’s failure to post notice is not in
dispute”); Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2002) (“Accordingly, this court holds that an employer's failure to post the notice required by 29
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states the applicable federal minimum wage in large type at the top, and in
smaller type below describes workers’ rights concerning overtime pay,
child labor, and proper payment methods for tipped employees (Type B
information). The poster also discusses the process for enforcing the
FLSA, but, oddly, focuses primarily on the DOL’s ability to bring FLSA
lawsuits, leaving out information about workers’ own ability to file
lawsuits (Type C information) and the double damages and attorneys’ fees
they might collect if victorious (Type D).71 In addition, the poster contains
a single line discussing protections against retaliation, another Type D fact
that might influence a worker’s assessment of her incentives to engage in
rights enforcement: “The law also prohibits discriminating against or
discharging workers who file a complaint or participate in any proceeding
under the Act.”72
The DOL’s original justification for the poster explicitly linked greater
worker knowledge of their substantive legal rights to better enforcement of
the law:
It has been found that effective enforcement of the act
depends to a great extent upon knowledge on the part of
covered employees of the provisions of the act and the
applicability of such provisions to them, and a greater degree
of compliance with the act has been effected in situations
where employees are aware of their rights under the law.73
The DOL went on to describe well-informed workers as a “necessary
adjunct to proper enforcement of the statutory provisions.”74
Thus, break room posters appear to be designed to function
prophylactically, to provide Type B–D information to workers and
simultaneously remind employers of their legal obligations.75 Remedial
notices ordered by the NLRB, explored next, are more of an antidote than a
prophylactic, designed as an ex post corrective for employer misbehavior.
Despite this difference, however, the NLRB remedial notice also transmits
context, process, and incentives information to both workers and
employers.

C.F.R. § 516.4 tolls the limitations period until the employee acquires a general awareness of his rights
under the FLSA.”).
71
Employee Rights Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Poster, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/minwagebwp.pdf [http://perma.cc/46GDK3KQ] (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
72
Id.
73
Posting of Notices, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516, 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949) (emphasis added).
74
Id.
75
Id.
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2. The NLRB Remedial Notice
Though there is presently no universal requirement that employers
display a break room poster describing workers’ labor rights, a subject
revisited in Part IV below, employers who commit unfair labor practices
are routinely ordered by the National Labor Relations Board to post a
remedial notice.76 This notice, a sample of which appears as FIGURE 4 in
the Appendix, informs workers of their substantive rights to organize into a
union and bargain collectively (Type B information), the contact
information for the local NLRB compliance officer (Type C), and the
employer’s promise not to retaliate against any worker who exercises her
labor rights (Type D).77 Similar remedial notices are required by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the event of OSHA
violations.78
From the early days of their usage, NLRB remedial notices have been
described as a corrective for workers’ lack of knowledge about their labor
76
NLRB v. Penn. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268 (1938) (affirming the NLRB’s power to
require remedial notice posting); In re J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *2
(Oct. 22, 2010) (“The requirement that respondents post a notice informing employees of their rights
under the Act, the violations found by the Board, the respondent’s undertaking to cease and desist from
such unlawful conduct in the future, and the affirmative action to be taken by the respondent to redress
the violations has been an essential element of the Board’s remedies for unfair labor practices since the
earliest cases under the [National Labor Relations] Act.”); Leonard R. Page, NLRB Remedies: Where
Are They Going?, LAWMEMO (Apr. 10, 2000), http://www.lawmemo.com/nlrb/remedies.htm [http://
perma.cc/V7MP-ZYKF] (“The Board's practice of including notice postings in its remedial orders dates
back to the Board's inception.”).
77
A typical NLRB remedial notice, such as the one shown in the Appendix, must be posted
conspicuously for sixty days, both physically in the workplace and electronically by email and posting
on internet and intranet sites. J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *4 (“In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees [members] by such means.”). In some circumstances,
courts also require employers to read the notice aloud to their workforce and mail a copy to each
worker. Federated Logistics & Operations v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 920, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing the “particularized need” standard for compelling the public reading of a NLRB remedial
order). Remedial notices must be signed by a representative of the employer and customarily state
workers’ rights under the NLRA, as well as the employer’s pledge to respect those rights in the future
and cease any wrongdoing. J & R Flooring, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *4 (discussing
remedial “notices to employees concerning the violations found by the Board, the remedies ordered,
and the underlying rights of the employees”); id. at *6 (requiring an “indication that the notice has been
duly signed”).
78
29 C.F.R. § 1903.16(a) (2013) (“Upon receipt of any citation under the Act, the employer shall
immediately post such citation, or a copy thereof, unedited, at or near each place an alleged violation
referred to in the citation occurred . . . .”); see also, e.g., Citation and Notification of Penalty, Bostik,
Inc., Inspection No. 315298307 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 12, 2011) (on file with author) (describing
citations, penalties, posting requirements, and workers’ rights: “The law prohibits discrimination by an
employer against an employee for filing a complaint or for exercising any rights under this Act. An
employee who believes that he/she has been discriminated against may file a complaint no later than 30
days after the discrimination occurred with the U.S. Department of Labor Area Office at the address
shown above.”).
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rights (Type B information) and protections against retaliation (Type D). In
1940, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court described the NLRB’s
“purpose” in requiring a remedial notice as increasing workers’
“knowledge of a guarantee of an unhampered right in the future to
determine their own labor affiliation.”79 The Court went on to expound on
the role of information in the project of enforcing workers’ labor rights:
Knowledge on the part of the men that the company would
cease and desist from hampering, interfering with and
coercing them in selection of a bargaining agent . . . was
essential if the employees were to feel free to exercise their
rights without incurring the company’s disfavor.80
Lower courts have similarly noted the ability of the remedial notice to
educate workers about their substantive labor rights and especially to
correct employer-created misinformation. The Seventh Circuit has
commented, for example, that “requiring an employer to post a notice will
carry significant impact in informing employees of their rights and
effectuating the policies of the Act,”81 while the Fifth Circuit has described
forced notice-posting as “let[ting] . . . a warming wind of information and,
more important, reassurance” into a workplace that has been “chilled” by
employers’ unfair labor practices.82 Remedial notices, like break room
posters, are therefore rooted in the concept that forcing the transmission of
Type B–D information—informing workers of their labor rights, the
process for enforcement, and their protections against retaliation—will
result in greater enforcement of and compliance with labor law.
3. Anti-Harassment Policies and Complaint Procedures
Many employers inform workers about their firms’ anti-harassment
policies, including the rights and prohibitions of employment law (Type B
information); many have also devised internal complaint procedures for
workers to report instances of discrimination or harassment (Type C).
Some states, such as California,83 affirmatively require these forms of
information transmission. Even in the absence of a mandate, employers
79

NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 462 (1940).
Id.
81
NLRB v. Methodist Hosp. of Gary, 733 F.2d 43, 48 (7th Cir. 1984); see also NLRB v. Gen.
Thermodynamics, 670 F.2d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The Board could reasonably conclude that
requiring respondent to post a notice regarding the change in its solicitation and distribution rule will
carry more impact in informing employees of their rights and effectuating the policies of the Act than
the respondent's muted removal of the rules from the bulletin boards.”).
82
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1969). A former NLRB General
Counsel has stated similarly, “The Board notice serves an important purpose: it describes their rights to
employees and reassures them that these rights will be vindicated.” Page, supra note 76.
83
See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 322 of 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(describing what information employers must provide their employees).
80
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may be strongly incentivized to engage in information disclosure in order
to gain access to a defense to certain types of Title VII hostile work
environment claims: the Ellerth/ Faragher defense.84
The Ellerth/ Faragher defense takes its name from two Supreme Court
decisions that were issued on the same day in 1998.85 Both involved hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims, in which a supervisor
committed harassment and the plaintiff sought to hold the employer itself
vicariously liable under Title VII.86 The Court held that employers in these
circumstances can defend themselves by showing that they “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior,” and, additionally, that the plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer.”87 The Court noted further that “an antiharassment policy with
complaint procedure” is one form that the employer’s preventative efforts
might take.88
Taking this language as their starting point, lower courts have
considered what might count as a sufficient antiharassment policy for
Ellerth/ Faragher purposes. Courts tend to ask two questions. First, what is
the substance of the employer’s policy?89 Second, how is the policy
disseminated?90 With respect to substance, courts look favorably on
policies that “define[] sexual harassment, [give] specific examples of
sexual harassment, and set forth a statement that retaliation would not be
tolerated.”91 Though courts do not require antiharassment policies to be
84
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998). Indeed, the line between mandated and incentivized behavior may be blurrier than it first
appears. One is never truly required to comply with the law, only incentivized to avoid the
consequences of law-breaking.
85
Both cases were decided on June 26, 1998. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
86
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746–47 (“We decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet
suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the
employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions.” (citation omitted)); Faragher,
524 U.S. at 780 (“This case calls for identification of the circumstances under which an employer may
be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of a supervisory employee
whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to
employment discrimination.” (citation omitted)).
87
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
88
Id. at 765, 773.
89
See id. at 765 (“[T]he need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”).
90
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (stating that the employer city was unable to raise an affirmative
defense because it failed to disseminate its sexual harassment policy).
91
Taylor v. CSX Transp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2006); see also McGriff v. Am.
Airlines, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (stating with approval that “American has
offered as evidence a copy of its Policy Statement, which expresses American's commitment to
providing a workplace free of unlawful harassment and which provides a listing of protected traits as
well as a non-exhaustive list of the forms unlawful harassment might take.”).
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couched in terms of workers’ legal rights as such, many policies appear to
use the language of law and rights. For example, a policy described by the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi stated the
employer’s goal of providing “a working environment in which employees
are free from discomfort or pressure resulting from jokes, ridicule, slurs,
threats and harassment relating to race, color, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, religion, national origin, age, disability, veteran status or
other legally protected characteristics.”92 Similarly, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidance on the content
of antiharassment policies recommends that employers “inform[]
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment
under [T]itle VII.”93 Thus, policies developed in reaction to Ellerth and
Faragher often become vehicles for transmission of Type B information
about workers’ legal rights.
With respect to the dissemination of antiharassment policies, courts
favor policies that may be accessed easily by employees in places where
they congregate, such as a “crew room” and on a company’s intranet and
“employee bulletin boards.”94 If a policy is contained in a lengthy
employee handbook, then it must be clearly identified and easily locatable
via a table of contents.95 And in Faragher itself, the Supreme Court noted
the district court’s finding that, while the defendant had an antiharassment
policy, it was functionally ineffective because it was never disseminated to
employees.96
Taken as a whole, then, courts’ interpretations of Ellerth and
Faragher, along with EEOC guidance, signal to employers that a robust
antiharassment policy, with a clear explanation of prohibited conduct
(Type B information), procedural instructions for claims-making (Type C),
and protections against retaliation (Type D), effectively publicized to
workers, is the best way to gain access to an affirmative defense to
92

Davis v. River Region Health Sys., 903 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (emphasis

added).
93

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2013) (emphasis added).
See Atwell v. Smart Ala., LLC, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“The Court
finds sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant's sexual
harassment policy was effective and was disseminated. The policy was in the employee handbook,
which was distributed to all employees during training. Managers were also given annual training in the
policy. The policy was posted on employee bulletin boards.”); Taylor, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1304–05
(discussing posting in a crew room).
95
Bush v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., No. 06-1110 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 1321853, at *5 (D.
Minn. May 4, 2007) (“More importantly, however, the Handbook's table of contents provides the
specific page where Penske's policy on harassment may be found.”).
96
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) (“The District Court found that the
City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees
and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [the ones in this
instance].”).
94
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vicarious liability. Though the Supreme Court did not rely on a
transparency rationale for its decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, the
availability of the affirmative defense nevertheless has informationtransmitting effects, as employers opt to create and disseminate antiharassment policies rather than suffer the alternative of proceeding
defenseless through litigation.97
4. Type B, C, and D Information on the Market Track
Thus far, this Part has surveyed existing transparency mandates that
force the transmission of Type B–D information in the context of a
worker’s rights-enforcing response to a disclosed workplace problem.
Turning to the market track, it is more difficult to identify requirements
that force employers to disclose job openings (Type B information), job
qualifications and the process for applying (Type C), and the range of
transaction and opportunity costs involved with job switching (Type D).
Certain employer-sponsored visa programs, such as the H-2A visa for
temporary agricultural workers and the H-2B visa for other foreign
workers, do require that employers advertise their job openings locally
before filling the positions with foreign visa-holders.98 Likewise, federal
law requires that housing developers who receive funds from the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) advertise their
jobs to members of the communities in which the housing is being
constructed.99
Each of these mandates forces employers to disclose Type B and C
information about job availability and processes, which could then enable
workers at other firms to identify and assess alternative jobs that may
prove to be a better match than their current employment. However, these
mandates are limited in scope, applying only to visa-sponsoring employers
and those who receive HUD funding. Indeed, there is no labor market-wide
job bank that a worker might consult upon learning Type A information
that would supply all layers of information necessary for her to engage in a
job-switching market response to a workplace problem.
97
Nor has the law review literature identified the information-transmitting nature of Ellerth and
Faragher, focusing in large part instead on whether the antiharassment policies prompted by those two
decisions are effective in enabling workers’ complaints and reducing workplace harassment. See, e.g.,
Tanya Katerí Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment &
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2006) (“The statistical analysis
of survey responses from a group of 120 female sexual harassment victims suggests that White women
and Women of Color may differ in their uses of internal complaint procedures.”); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Employment Law As Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2715–21 (2008) (providing an example of
collective action attempts after incidents of harassment). This Essay considers these same questions of
effectiveness—as applied to all forms of workplace transparency mandates—in Part IV.B, infra.
98
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.150–.158 (2010) (describing job advertisement requirements for the H2A visa program); 20 C.F.R. § 655.10 (2015) (same for H-2B visa program).
99
12 U.S.C. § 1701u(c)(2) (2012).
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C. Nonexistent Type E Disclosures
Finally, what about Type E information about the probability and
magnitude of other actors’ rights-enforcing and market responses to an
employer’s sub-legal or sub-market practices? As discussed above, this
information type is likely the most important for spurring employers to
take affirmative steps to correct workplace problems, even prior to or in
the absence of regulation or market discipline by other actors. In other
words, an employer who has accurate Type A–D information about a
workplace problem might correctly gauge her exposure to legal liability or
to a mass departure of workers. She might then be motivated to make
changes even before a lawsuit is filed or workers walk out. If, however, the
employer is secure in the Type E knowledge that her workers lack the
information and incentives to sue, or that regulatory action or outside
interest group pressure is highly unlikely, then even the most wellinformed and knowledgeable employers may allow workplace problems to
persist.
Yet there is no existing transparency mandate that requires the various
actors identified by this Essay to reveal their own intentions to engage in
rights-enforcing or market activity to address disclosed workplace
problems. In fact, regulatory agencies may desire to keep that information
quiet, so as to catch scofflaw employers off guard rather than tip them off
to impending investigations and enforcement actions. Thus, because of its
contingent nature, this information type may not be susceptible to
transmission. It is nevertheless a key component of the typology of
workplace information, as, in the end, an employer’s knowledge of the
likelihood of rights enforcement or market discipline may be a significant
predictor of whether change occurs at that workplace.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
This Part turns from the theoretical briefly to the practical, cataloging
some challenges and questions associated with workplace transparency
mandates. If each of the five types of information identified by this Essay
were to be made available to workers, regulators, and outside interest
groups, what would that look like? Who would be required to provide the
information, to whom, in what form, and under what legal authority?
Moreover, what questions should we ask to determine whether workplace
transparency mandates actually accomplish their first-order goals of
transmitting information and their second-order goals of triggering rightsenforcing and market responses? This Part begins to sketch out these
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A. The Constitutionality of Workplace Transparency Mandates
The first, and perhaps most important, set of threshold questions
associated with workplace transparency mandates concerns their
constitutionality. Indeed, the First Amendment may be implicated
whenever the government compels a private entity to speak, or to adopt or
display the speech of another (e.g., the hazard warnings, pay transparency
rules, and workplace posters and notices described above).101
Historically, the constitutionality of break room posters and remedial
notices—transmissions of Type B–D information—seems simply to have
been assumed by courts. In the only case that decided a First Amendment
challenge to a break room poster, Lake Butler Apparel v. Secretary of
Labor,102 an employer refused, on free speech grounds, “to post the
standard [Occupational Safety and Health Act] poster informing the
employees of their safety rights under the Act.”103 The Fifth Circuit
dismissed the employer’s argument as out of hand, calling it “seemingly
nonsensical” and concluding that “if the government has a right to
promulgate these regulations it seems obvious that they have a right to
statutorily require that they be posted in a place that would be obvious to
the intended beneficiaries of the statute.”104 The court further held:
The posting of the notice does not by any stretch of the
imagination reflect one way or the other on the views of the
employer. It merely states what the law requires. The
employer may differ with the wisdom of the law and this
requirement even to the point as done here, of challenging its
validity. . . . But the First Amendment which gives him the
full right to contest validity to the bitter end cannot justify his
refusal to post a notice Congress thought to be essential.105
100

Alexander, supra note 22.
See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (“Just as the First
Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the
government from compelling individuals to express certain views, or from compelling certain
individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.” (citations omitted)); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n
of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (“In reaching our conclusion, we relied on the principle
that ‘[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind’ . . . .” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977))).
102
519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); see also McFarlane, supra note 69, at 430 (“The NLRB notes that
it ‘is unaware of any challenge to the Labor Department's authority to promulgate or enforce the FLSA
notice requirement, which has been in effect for over 60 years.’”).
103
Lake Butler Apparel, 519 F.2d at 85.
104
Id. at 89.
105
Id.
101
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With respect to NLRB remedial notices, it is clear that the NLRA has
extremely broad remedial powers to correct past employer misfeasance,
and in that connection may force employers to post the sorts of remedial
notices examined in this Essay. The NLRB may even force employers
personally to read such notices to their assembled workforce, in order to
“dispel the atmosphere of intimidation created in large part by [the
employer’s] own statements and actions.”106 Moreover, in the only roughly
similar case to have considered a challenge to OSHA’s remedial noticeposting requirement, the Tenth Circuit rejected an employer’s argument
that such a notice violated its constitutional rights by “forc[ing] it to vilify
and publish at its own expense the respondent's unproved accusations.”107
Finally, in a case that did not take on First Amendment questions
directly, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless observed that “an employer’s [First
Amendment] right to silence is sharply constrained in the labor context,
and leaves it subject to a variety of burdens to post notices of rights and
risks.”108 The Second Circuit has elaborated on this point, noting with
respect to the NLRA in particular that “the employer’s entitlement to free
speech is not categorical, but limited by the NLRA concept of coercion; to
avoid [anti-union] coercion[,] . . . the NLRB can limit the content of
employer speech more severely than would be permissible if the NLRA
rights of the employees were not simultaneously affected.”109
Despite this seemingly settled precedent, the constitutionality of the
break room poster was thrown back into contention recently in a 2013 D.C.
Circuit decision that struck down the NLRB’s attempt to institute a
workplace poster requirement.110 Previously, the NLRA had been almost
unique among federal workplace rights statutes in its lack of a poster
requirement.111 In enacting a new poster rule, the NLRB referred to
106
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (quoting Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1386–87 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see also Federated
Logistics & Operations v. NLRB, 400 F.3d 920, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the strong anti-union
campaign by the corporation).
107
Stockwell Mfg. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306, 1309–10 (10th Cir. 1976); cf. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding OSHA hazard labeling requirements of the
sort examined by Viscusi and in Part II, supra, in the face of a First Amendment challenge).
108
UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
109
Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2006).
110
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part by Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Another employers’ group sued
the NLRB in the Fourth Circuit, which also invalidated the poster rule, but on the ground that the
NLRB had exceeded its authority in issuing the rule. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d
152 (4th Cir. 2013). For a discussion of both cases, see Charles J. Morris, Notice-Posting of Employee
Rights: NLRB Rulemaking and the Upcoming Backfire, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529699.
111
See Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg.
54,006, 54,018 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (explaining new rule requiring
employers subject to the NLRA to post notices informing their employees of their rights under the
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workers’ lack of Type B information about their labor rights and the
necessity of addressing this information deficit in order to spur rights
enforcement.112 In National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB (NAM
I), however, the D.C. Circuit blocked the poster rule.113 The decision is a
statutory one—interpreting a provision of the NLRA—but with strong
constitutional overtones and heavy reliance on First Amendment case law.
The remainder of this Part explains the NAM I opinion and begins to map
out its significance for the constitutionality of other workplace
transparency mandates.
The crux of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in NAM I is the protection
provided to employers by section 8(c) of the NLRA. That section reads in
its entirety:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.114
Thus, under this section, an employer’s speech may not be deemed an
unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA unless the speech is
coercive.115 The NLRB’s new poster rule, however, rendered an
employer’s failure to display the poster an unfair labor practice in two
ways: the failure itself could be judged an unfair labor practice,116 and the
failure could also be used as evidence of an employer’s anti-union animus
to bolster charges of other, separate unfair labor practices.117
The interpretive task for the D.C. Circuit, then, was to determine
whether an employer’s refusal to display the NLRB’s poster amounted to
speech that was protected by section 8(c) against penalty as an unfair labor
practice. NAM I is therefore not a true First Amendment case, as the
NLRA).
112
Id. at 54,018 n.96 (“[E]ven if only 10 percent of workers were unaware of those rights, that
would still mean that more than 10 million workers lacked knowledge of one of their most basic
workplace rights. The Board believes that there is no question that at least a similar percentage of
employees are unaware of the rights explained in the notice. In the Board's view, that justifies issuing
the rule.”).
113
NAM I, 717 F.3d at 959.
114
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).
115
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (defining coercive and noncoercive
speech for purposes of the NLRA).
116
29 C.F.R. § 104.210 (2014) (“Failure to post the employee notice may be found to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by NLRA Section 7, 29
U.S.C. 157, in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1).”).
117
Id. § 104.214(b) (“The Board may consider a knowing and willful refusal to comply with the
requirement to post the employee notice as evidence of unlawful motive in a case in which motive is an
issue.”).
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plaintiffs did not claim that the poster requirement infringed directly on
their free speech rights guaranteed by the Constitution; employers’
obligations to hang government-provided and required posters had, after
all, been affirmed uncontroversially in cases like Lake Butler.
However, the D.C. Circuit’s guidance in determining whether an
employer’s non-compliance with the poster requirement was an act of
expression protected by section 8(c) came wholly from First Amendment
case law. The court determined that the First Amendment protects against
compelled speech, and that section 8(c) does as well: “Like the freedom of
speech guaranteed in the First Amendment, § 8(c) necessarily protects—as
against the Board—the right of employers . . . not to speak.”118 Because the
NLRB, by virtue of its poster requirement, “selected the message and
ordered its citizens to convey that message,”119 the poster amounted to
compelled speech. The fact that the poster “merely recites” workers’ rights
under established statutory law to organize into a union and bargain
collectively did not save the poster regulation; the court appeared to credit
the plaintiffs’ contention that the poster presented a “one-sided,”
employee-friendly depiction of labor law that interfered with employers’
right to express their own anti-union opinions.120 On these grounds, the
D.C. Circuit struck down the poster requirement.
Notwithstanding the explicitly statutory nature of the NAM I
opinion,121 subsequent cases have cited it for the proposition that break
room poster requirements infringe on employers’ free speech rights
generally, without restriction to the specific protections offered by section
8(c).122 In fact, after NAM I, the National Association of Manufacturers
filed a copycat suit (NAM II) against the Department of Labor, making a
direct First Amendment challenge to an Obama Administration Executive
Order requiring federal contractors to post substantially the same labor
rights poster that was at issue in NAM I.123 The NAM II court held that the
poster requirement did not amount to compelled speech in violation of the
employers’ First Amendment rights, distinguishing NAM I’s statutory

118

NAM I, 717 F.3d at 959.
Id. at 957.
120
Id. at 957–58.
121
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“NAM [I] in
fact did not apply the First Amendment at all, but rested instead on 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), which, it
carefully explained, goes significantly beyond merely incorporating the First Amendment.”).
122
E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing NAM I
as “concluding that ordering companies themselves to display certain information on their premises
violates ‘[t]he right against compelled speech’ even if that information is non-ideological” (quoting
NAM I, 717 F.3d at 957)).
123
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Perez, No. 1:13-CV-01998 (APM), 2015 WL 2148230 (D.D.C. May 7,
2015).
119
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124

holding. Nevertheless, as employment and constitutional law scholar
Helen Norton points out, “The [NAM I] court’s broad view of employers’
speech rights suggests a willingness to find other employer disclosure
requirements—including other statutory notice-posting requirements—to
violate the First Amendment.”125
A separate article engages in a full constitutional analysis of these
questions.126 However, some preliminary observations are in order. In a
settled line of cases stemming from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,127 courts have applied rational
basis review and upheld a range of government regulations requiring
companies to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial” information
about their products and services.128 Because these regulations concern
non-ideological commercial speech, they do not warrant the strict scrutiny
normally applied in First Amendment cases, and because the agencies that
promulgated the regulations can typically advance a rational state interest
for forcing this information, the regulations usually withstand First
Amendment challenge.129 The labeling and disclosure requirements at issue
in this line of cases provide classic Type A information to consumers about
the contents and quality of products and services.130 The information at
issue in NAM I and NAM II, however, was Type B–D information about
workers’ substantive legal rights and the processes and incentives for
enforcement.
In NAM I, the NLRB attempted to analogize its poster requirement
with the purely factual Type A labeling and disclosure requirements upheld

124
Id. at *5 (“Plaintiffs argue that NAM 's discussion of the First Amendment inexorably leads to
the conclusion that the Posting Rule at issue here abridges their members' First Amendment speech
rights. But NAM does not carry the constitutional weight that Plaintiffs ascribe to it. As Plaintiffs
conceded at oral argument, NAM did not announce a First Amendment holding.”).
125
Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment
15 (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
126
Alexander, supra note 22.
127
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
128
Id. at 651.
129
See Blasi, supra note 15, at 126–29 (detailing cases in which courts found that agencies
sufficiently advanced rational state interests to justify regulations concerning non-ideological
commercial speech). In Zauderer itself, the regulation at issue was designed to provide information to
prevent consumer deception by a commercial speaker. 471 U.S. at 651. Lower courts, however, have
expanded Zauderer’s application of rational basis review beyond contexts involving deception only.
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“To the extent that other
cases in this circuit may be read as . . . limiting Zauderer to cases in which the government points to an
interest in correcting deception, we now overrule them.”).
130
Blasi, supra note 15, at 128–29 (collecting cases upholding rules “requiring disclosure of
mercury in products or packaging, caloric content information in restaurant menus and menu boards,
fee arrangements in advertising for legal services, information concerning the public impact of storm
water discharges by municipal storm operators, and notice of a preliminary injunction to be posted on
the website of a company engaged in suspect tax advice” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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in the Zauderer line of cases. The plaintiffs objected to this contention,
arguing that the NLRB’s description of workers’ labor rights was slanted
and inherently ideological.132 Though the D.C. Circuit appeared to credit
the plaintiffs’ argument,133 it offered no explanation or guidance about
where to draw the line between ideological and “purely factual and
uncontroversial” statements of the law.
Indeed, the position adopted by the plaintiffs in the NAM I case and
tacitly endorsed by the D.C. Circuit raises more questions than it answers.
Taken to its logical conclusion, one might imagine that in the NAM I
plaintiffs’ view, there can never be a “factual” Type B statement of the law
that is completely neutral, short of a verbatim recitation of statutory or
regulatory text. The process of summarizing necessarily involves editorial
judgment about which provisions are more and less important, which is, of
course, guided by the editor’s ideological beliefs. Similarly, the act of
paraphrasing to make legal language accessible to more readers might be
an ideological act in and of itself, as it presupposes a belief that legal
knowledge should be available even to those who do not have access to a
lawyer to translate and interpret.
Given these implications of the NAM I plaintiffs’ position, then, the
constitutional status of the existing statements of employment law
contained in the numerous posters that hang on break room walls around
the country may be called into question. In a bright spot for workplace
transparency mandates, however, the NAM II court rejected the plaintiffs’
contention that the poster’s “slanted” characterization of labor law
constituted a First Amendment violation.134 According to the NAM II court,
“when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices;”135
thus, “even if the [labor rights] Notice is incomplete, the decision to omit
certain rights to effectuate a presidential policy decision does not offend
the First Amendment.”136

131
NAM I, 717 F.3d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The poster, the Board’s acting general counsel
tells us, merely recites the employee rights set forth in the National Labor Relations Act (and in court
and Board interpretations of the Act). And so, the argument goes, this case is unlike Barnette or
Wooley because the Board’s message is ‘non-ideological.’”); id. at 959 n.18 (describing NLRB’s
citation to Zauderer).
132
Id. at 958 (describing plaintiffs’ portrayal of the poster as “one-sided, as favoring
unionization”).
133
Id. (raising concern that plaintiffs’ accommodation of the NLRB’s poster would affect the
plaintiffs’ own expression of their message).
134
NAM II, No. 1:13-CV-01998 (APM), 2015 WL 2148230, at *8 (D.D.C. May 7, 2015).
135
Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
136
Id.
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B. But Does Any of This Actually Work?
Beyond constitutionality, there is another set of basic, unanswered
threshold questions about workplace transparency mandates: Do they
actually work? Specifically, do transparency mandates accomplish their
first-order task of transmitting information to their target audiences? Do
they accomplish their second-order task of triggering regulatory and
market responses to correct workplace problems?137 If not, how might they
be revised to better accomplish their goals?
With respect to the first-order goal of achieving information
transmission, scholars in many disciplines have written extensively about
the problems associated with cognitive bias, which can prevent people
from fully understanding and appreciating disclosed information.138
Moreover, if a worker does not take sufficient notice of an information
disclosure,139 or does not read or understand the language in which the
workplace information is delivered, then the information may never reach
its intended audience. For example, though farmworkers are now required
by the Worker Protection Standard of the Environmental Protection Act to
be informed about occupational exposure to pesticides, worker advocates
report that hazard warnings are often available only in English and
Spanish, while farmworkers increasingly speak only the indigenous
languages of Mexico and Central America.140
Moreover, anecdotal accounts abound about the ineffectiveness of
break room posters: their very ubiquity may mean that they tend to fade
into the background of the workplace. For example, in the rulemaking
process concerning the NLRB’s now-defeated break room poster
137
As Viscusi and Magat put it, “[T]he relevant question for evaluating information programs
such as hazard warnings is whether they induce behavioral changes in the desired direction and of
sufficient magnitude to remedy the information problem.” VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 9.
138
See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 391 (“Of course, information may not be useful
given its complexity, its sheer quantity, its presentation, or because of cognitive biases.”); see also
VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note 14, at 1–41 (discussing “[i]nformation [p]rocessing and [i]ndividual
[d]ecisions” and “[c]ognitive [c]onsiderations in [p]resenting [r]isk [i]nformation”).
139
Viscusi and his collaborators, in addition to other scholars, have conducted experiments to
determine the best form and format for workplace hazard warnings. See, e.g, Mamdouh I. Farid &
Sidney I. Lirtzman, Effects of Hazard Warnings on Workers’ Attitudes and Risk-Taking Behavior, 68
PSYCHOL. REP. 659, 670 (1991) (“The data also support that workers are capable of perceiving changes
in job hazards and changing their job-related attitudes, intentions, and demands accordingly.”). See
generally VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS, supra note 14, at 197–205 (presenting data to “explore the
impact of individuals’ job hazard perceptions on their quit intentions”); VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note
14, at 98–124 (discussing experiments and results).
140
Linda McCauley et al., Oregon Indigenous Farmworkers: Results of Promotor Intervention on
Pesticide Knowledge and Organophosphate Metabolite Levels, 55 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED.
1164, 1164 (2013) (“Most frequently the [pesticide] training is conducted in either English or Spanish.
There are no state- or federal-specified guidelines on how to provide culturally and linguistically
appropriate training of the increasing numbers of farmworkers whose primary language is indigenous,
who speak neither English nor Spanish, or who understand very rudimentary Spanish at best.”).
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requirement, the agency received comments from employers that “[p]osters
are an ineffective means of educating workers and are rarely read by
employees,”141 and that “adding one more notice to the many that are
already mandated under other statutes will simply create more ‘visual
clutter’ that contributes to employees’ disinclination to pay attention to
posted notices.”142 Another employer stated in a comment that, “My
bulletin boards are filled with required notifications that nobody reads. In
the past 15 years, not one of our 200 employees has ever asked about any
of these required postings. I have never seen anyone ever read one of
them.”143
In addition, as I have pointed out in previous work, in an analysis of
surveys of over 4300 low-wage workers, “approximately 59% of lowwage, front-line workers did not know their minimum wage and overtime
rights and 78% did not know how to file a government complaint.”144
Because both subjects are addressed explicitly on the required FLSA poster
discussed above, this lack of Type B legal knowledge may be evidence of
the shortcomings of this method of information dissemination.
Research by Pauline Kim also suggests that, even in the face of explicit
statements about the lack of job security in at-will jobs, many workers
continue to believe that they can be fired only for good cause.145 Kim
hypothesizes that powerful social norms about fair treatment may trump
even the most clear statements of the limits of the law.146 In order for the
transmission of information to “take,” therefore, the mechanisms for
information transmission that are currently in place in the workplace may
be too limited, passive, and unobtrusive.
Even assuming perfect and complete transmission of all necessary
information, however, workers, regulators, and outside interest groups may
still be unmoved to address a disclosed workplace problem. This is because
141
Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,017
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1110.
145
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110, 133 (1998) (quizzing over 330
unemployed workers on knowledge of at-will employment legal rules and finding that workers gave
correct answers only 51% of the time on average); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law:
Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 458 (1999)
[hereinafter Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law] (administering the same survey in multiple additional
states and finding corresponding correct answer rates ranging from 25.2% to 40%); see also David
Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in
the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 59, 63 (2005) (“There is little reason to believe that
workers uniformly exercise rights granted them under labor policies.”).
146
Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, supra note 145, at 448 (“[I]t appears that workers do not
readily distinguish between informal norms and enforceable legal rights, between what they believe the
law should be and what it actually is.”).
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the content of the information transmitted may be inimical to rightsenforcing and market action. For example, Ms. Matthew worked at
numerous farms beginning when she was six years old, all of which she
believes made indiscriminate use of extremely toxic agricultural
pesticides.147 Even perfect Type B context information about the other jobs
available to her as a farmworker might not have prompted her to change
jobs, as no other, better job existed. Likewise, if the H-2B workers in
Mississippi had sought to change jobs, they, too, would not have been
helped even by perfect Type B information, as the rules of their visas
prohibited them from working for any other employer.148 Similarly, perfect
Type C information about the process for engaging in a rights-enforcing
response to a workplace problem may not actually trigger rights-enforcing
activity if that process is too burdensome or complex.149 Finally, if a
worker learns through Type D information that retaliation for a workplace
complaint is a virtual certainty, then she will be unlikely to take action.
Here, information transmission may in fact have a silencing, rather than
action-triggering, effect.
Indeed, my previous study of low-wage workers’ actions in the face of
disclosed workplace problems revealed a drop-off of more than forty
percent between problem identification and legal claims, meaning that
almost half of workers who knew that their rights had been violated did not
pursue legal redress.150 Similarly, scholars have criticized the Ellerth/
Faragher structure precisely because many survivors of workplace
harassment choose not to make complaints despite the availability of—and
their knowledge of—anti-harassment law, policies, and complaint
procedures.151 Thus, even if workplace transparency mandates were
completely effective in transmitting complete information to workers,
whether workers do in fact become the “adjunct[s] to proper enforcement
of the statutory provisions”152 envisioned by the proponents of informationcentric strategies, and whether regulators and outside interest groups
engage in rights-enforcing or market responses of their own, remain open
empirical questions in need of further study.
147

SLONGWHITE, supra note 3, at 38–39.
Preston, supra note 40.
149
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 14 (describing the months-long, highly burdensome process
under the Environmental Protection Act’s Worker Protection Standard of requesting and ultimately
gaining access to the name of pesticides to which a worker was exposed).
150
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 44, at 1089.
151
Hernández, supra note 97, at 1239 (“The statistical analysis of survey responses from a group
of 120 female sexual harassment victims suggests that White women and Women of Color may differ
in their uses of internal complaint procedures.”); Sachs, supra note 97, at 2744–45 (“[R]esearch
suggests that the number of complaints filed dramatically under-represents the extent of statutory
violations.”).
152
Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, 14 Fed. Reg. 7516 (Dec. 16, 1949).
148
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V. CONCLUSION
This Essay has presented a comprehensive theory of information’s role
in the enforcement of labor and employment laws, and in the broader
project of improving workplace conditions. It has identified three sets of
actors, as consumers of workplace information, who might engage in
rights-enforcing or market responses to workplace problems, and examined
the different types of information necessary to each actor for each type of
response.
The typology of workplace information developed here is an important
extension of the existing literature, which has tended to confine its
examination of transparency mandates to those that force the disclosure of
information about the hidden conditions of work. As shown here, those
disclosures may be necessary but not sufficient to trigger action to address
workplace problems. Moreover, this Essay provides an important
framework for assessing calls, such as Estlund’s, for greater transparency
in the workplace.153 If such proposals focus only on revealing firm-specific
information about the hidden conditions of work, then they will be unable
to harness the market and facilitate law enforcement in the way that
proponents envision.
A second, companion article takes up these questions on a more
practical level,154 investigating whether and in what circumstances
workplace transparency mandates might raise First Amendment issues, and
how mandates might best be structured to better accomplish their firstorder goal of informing their target audiences and their second-order goal
of improving the conditions of work.

153
Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 15, at 364–66 (listing categories of information that might
be disclosed via workplace transparency mandates).
154
Alexander, supra note 22.
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Employee Rights Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Poster, supra note 71.
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FIGURE 4: Sample NLRB Remedial Notice

156
McKinney v. Creative Vision Res., No. 12-cv-1934, Ex. B at 33 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2013)
(order denying motion to strike).

